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Abstract 
 
 
This paper examines how the growth in vote-by-mail and changes in voting technologies led to 
changes in the residual vote rate in California from 1990 to 2010.  We find that in California’s 
presidential elections, counties that abandoned punch cards in favor of optical scanning enjoyed 
a significant improvement in the residual vote rate.  However, these findings do not always 
translate to other races.  For instance, find that the InkaVote system in Los Angeles has been a 
mixed success, performing very well in presidential and gubernatorial races, fairly well for ballot 
propositions, and poorly in Senate races.  We also conduct the first analysis of the effects of the 
rise of vote-by-mail on residual votes.  Regardless of the race, increased use of the mails to cast 
ballots is robustly associated with a rise in the residual vote rate.  The effect is so strong that the 
rise of voting by mail in California has mostly wiped out all the reductions in residual votes that 
were due to improved voting technologies since the early 1990s.
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A decade ago, the nation became aware that voting machines are not simple ciphers through 
which voters cast their ballots.  Palm Beach County, Florida provided the best illustration of how 
machine malfunction — exemplified by “hanging” and “pregnant” chad — and poor ballot 
design — exemplified by the “butterfly ballot” — could result in a vote being miscounted, if 
counted at all (e.g., Sinclair et al. 2000; Smith 2002; Wand et al. 2001). 
The Florida fiasco resulted in a strong public demand for improved voting technology, 
and led to a flurry of new research into the causes of “lost votes” due to voting technologies.1  
Within political science, this research has focused on explaining the residual vote rate in 
presidential elections as a function of the type of voting technology used by voters.  (The 
residual vote rate is the percentage of ballots cast that either contain an over- or undervote for a 
particular race.) Making this research particularly important was the simultaneous emergence of 
public demand for improved voting technology to reduce the residual vote rate.  This was made 
explicit by the Help America Vote Act which mandated retirement of older technologies and 
resulted in billions of state and federal dollars being spent to retire old voting machines. 
                                                 
1 For example, Alvarez et al. 2005; Ansolabehere 2002; Ansolabehere and Stewart 2005; Stewart 2006; Kimball and 
Kropf 2008; Sinclair and Alvarez 2004; Tomz and Van Houweling 2003.  See Stewart (2011) for a review of 
research on voting technology in general. 
2 
 
Despite the importance of this line of research, at least two significant questions have not 
been addressed in the scope of residual votes. First, despite the fact that American elections are 
noted for their long ballots, the new research has largely ignored residual votes for races further 
down the ballot, such as for state and local offices or ballot measures. Second, at the same time 
that states and local jurisdictions across the country have retired their antiquated voting 
technologies in a drive to push down the number of lost votes, many of the same states and 
localities have seen a surge in voting by mail, either by liberalizing absentee ballot laws or 
mandating vote-by-mail altogether.  How this has affected residual vote rates remains unknown.   
The purpose of this paper is to use recent elections in California as a laboratory to help 
address these two questions, (1) whether changes in voting technologies have the same effects in 
reducing lost votes in races other than the president and (2) whether the rise of voting by mail 
has reinforced federal voting technology policy.  The answer to the first question is a qualified 
“yes.”  The answer to the second question is a qualified “no.”  
California provides an apt laboratory for answering these questions because of its size, 
length of ballot, use of various voting technologies, and because of the importance of its ballot 
measures.  Studying how voting technologies affect lost votes down the ballot is difficult in 
nationwide research because states are highly variable both in the number of offices that are up 
for election, including those on the statewide ballot, and in specifying the order in which offices 
appear on the ballot.  The number of statewide offices in California is exceptional, which allows 
us to study the down-ballot effects with some precision.  Finally, the general structure of the 
ballot is fixed across the state, allowing for local offices to be sandwiched between the statewide 
races at the top and ballot measures toward the bottom of the ballot.2  Moreover, because of the 
                                                 
2 Section 13109, subsection n of California’s Election Code states that ballots measures should appear on the ballot 
after all candidate races, and that state measures should appear before local measures. 
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significant independent authority of the constitutional officers who are on the statewide 
California ballot, most of these positions are hotly contested. This minimizes (though does not 
eliminate) the problems that arise when studying low turnout elections.  
In addition, California is notable for the number, intensity, and policy significance of its 
ballots measures.3  Although California has not been alone in facing fiscal difficulties during the 
current recession, Cain and Noll (2010) argue that the initiative process has made fiscal affairs in 
California especially difficult to manage, by centralizing revenue-collection in Sacramento while 
fostering soft budget constrains for local government spending. Therefore, it is important to 
understand whether voting technologies influence the quality of direct democracy in the state. 
Using a pooled cross-sectional time series data set of California elections from 1990 to 
2010, this paper finds the following: 
1. The shift from Votomatic punch cards to optical scanning technologies has 
generally improved the residual vote rate in all types of elections in California.  
The transition from Votomatic punch cards to DREs in a few counties, which was 
reversed by a mid-decade decision of the Secretary of State, was also generally 
effective in reducing the residual vote rate, though less consistently than was the 
case with optical scanning. 
2. Los Angeles County, which adopted a unique voting system, the InkaVote, to 
replace the Votomatic system, has recovered votes in presidential and 
gubernatorial elections to a degree similar to counties that adopted optical 
scanning technologies.  However, these gains have not carried over to senatorial 
                                                 
3 For example, see Boehmke 2005; Gerber 1999; Gerber, McCubbins and Kiewiet 2001; Hajna, Gerber, and Louch 
(2002); Kahn and Matsusaka (1997); Lupia (1994); and Matsusaka 2004. 
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elections, or to ballot propositions, where InkaVote has performed only slightly 
better than Votomatic, and clearly worse than either optical scanning or DREs.  
3. The residual vote rate among California’s propositions has been reduced 
significantly because of the various rounds of voting machine replacement over 
the past decade.  In 2008, for instance, we estimate that almost 107,000 more 
votes were counted in each of the ballot measure contests than would have been 
the case without the retirement of the Votomatic punch cards. 
4. The rise of vote-by-mail in California has led to a steady rise in the residual vote 
rate up and down the ballot, undoing almost the entire benefit associated with 
improvements in voting technologies. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows.  Section I reviews previous research on the 
relationship between voting technology and residual votes.  Section II reviews the data that are 
analyzed in this report.  Section III discussions issues of model specification and estimation.  
Section IV reviews the results.  Section V concludes. 
 
I.  Previous research 
Research into the cause of lost votes since the 2000 Florida recount has focused on 
understanding how voting technologies influence whether the votes cast by voters — or that 
voters think they have cast — are in fact counted.  A related question is whether there is 
something about particular technologies, especially the ballot layouts employed, which induces 
voters to abstain from or participate in particular races on the ballot.  The two questions are 
related empirically, but have different intellectual roots. 
 The second question, whether different technologies encourage abstention, was the focus 
of the voting technology literature before 2000, to the degree it existed.  The dependent variable 
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was “roll-off,” defined as the difference in the number of ballots cast for the race at the top of the 
ticket, usually president, and some race further down the ballot, including initiatives.  The cause 
of roll-off was taken to be the evocatively-termed “voter fatigue,” induced by the strain put on 
low-information voters, as they tried to navigate through a ballot that contained increasingly 
obscure offices, moving from top to bottom.  This literature initially began with an interest in the 
effect of ballot design on roll-off, with the preeminent study being Walker (1966), which focused 
on ballot form (party list vs. office bloc).  Eventually, research turned to the issue of voting 
technology itself.  
Table 1 summarizes these pre-2000 studies of roll-off that focused on voting technology, 
noting the down-ballot races studied and the general findings that relate to voting technology.  
Two consistent findings emerged from this research.  First, mechanical voting machines 
regularly produced more roll-off than paper methods in voting on referenda.  Second, electronic 
voting machines generally produced less roll-off in down-ballot races. 
[Table 1 about here] 
 As Table 1 also indicates, some of the earliest studies about voting technology and roll-
off focused on ballot questions.  These studies were in reaction to astonishingly high roll-off 
rates in referenda, comparing counties that used mechanical lever machines to counties that still 
used hand-counted paper ballots.  For instance, Thomas (1968, Table 4) showed that the roll-off 
rates for constitutional revision referenda in Michigan held in 1958, 1960, 1961, and 1963 that 
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were cast on paper ballots were 13%, 13%, 1%, and -5%,4 respectively, compared to rates of 
39%, 35%, 17%, and 5% in counties that used lever machines.5 
As column 5 of Table 1 indicates, with only a couple of exceptions, the dependent 
variable in these studies was roll-off, calculated as the difference between the total votes cast in 
the down-ballot race (or ballot question) and the race at the top of the ticket, even in those cases 
in which total turnout was reported by the state.  Thus, the underlying behavioral model of this 
research — though never articulated directly — was that any over- or under-votes in the top race 
reflected a conscious abstention in that race.  A notable exception was Asher, Schussler, and 
Rosenfield (1982), whose research was prompted by an inexplicable number of missing votes at 
the top of the ticket — roll-on, as it were — in an Ohio gubernatorial election.  Their paper aside, 
the implied behavioral model of the roll-off literature was a bit convoluted.  Therefore, it was not 
of much help in understanding the 2000 Florida controversy, since the office of concern there 
was president. 
 Research into how voting technology can influence the act of voting shifted in response 
to Florida in two related ways.  First, the office of concern moved to the top of the ballot, 
particularly in presidential years.  Second, the dependent variable was recast as the “residual vote 
rate,” which was defined as total turnout minus the number of total ballots cast in a particular 
race, all divided by total turnout.  Stewart (2011) recently reviewed this literature, finding 
numerous articles, books, and reports that have used the residual vote rate as a dependent 
variable.  Almost all of these focus on the presidential election, with the only notable exceptions 
                                                 
4 Presumably, in 1963, more people voted in the referendum on the constitutional revisions in counties using paper 
ballots than voted on the top partisan race on the ballot. 
5 Thomas expressed the dependent variable as the “participation rate,” which we have subtracted from 100%, to 
make comparable to most other roll-off literature and the residual vote literature that is discussed next. 
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being Caltech/MIT Voting Technology Project (2001), Ansolabehere and Stewart (2005), 
Kimball and Kropf (2008), and Lott (2009).  Because its design and findings have the most 
bearing on the current paper, we discuss Kimball and Kropf’s research in more detail below. 
 The empirical coverage of this new line of research is limited to states that require their 
local jurisdictions to report total turnout.  Not all states require this, and therefore it is not 
possible to conduct residual vote research in every jurisdiction (Alvarez, Ansolabehere and 
Stewart 2005).  Luckily, the number of states (and the District of Columbia) reporting turnout 
has risen since 2000, from 39 then to 46 in 2008, and so it has become easier to conduct residual 
vote research in large nationwide studies. 
 In the mainstream post-2000 residual vote research, punch card systems consistently 
emerged as the biggest culprits in producing residual votes.  The Help America Vote Act 
(HAVA) required that states retire this technology, in favor of DREs and optical scanners.  One 
consequence of HAVA’s implementation is that, roughly one million more votes for president 
were accounted for in the 2004 presidential election. The 2008 election showed comparable 
gains (Stewart 2006). 
 Despite all the research that has documented the effects of voting technologies on 
residual votes, a number of important questions remain unstudied. One of those is how voting 
technologies affect residual votes “down-ballot,” that is, for races other than president or 
governor, especially ballot measures.  Consequently, the pre-2000 interest in the effects of voting 
technology on the set of elections that are more consequential for state and local politics, and 
where technology appeared to have the biggest impact on outcomes, has been lost. 
In a recent effort to initiate study of this question, Kimball and Kropf (2008) examined 
residual votes in 1,999 counties drawn from 34 states in the 2004 presidential election.  Their 
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analysis demonstrated that like previous studies of residual votes, the type of voting technology 
employed had an important association with the residual vote rate.  They also showed that the 
exact relationship between voting technology and residual vote rates was not the same at the 
presidential level compared to ballot measures.  For example, they found that although punch 
cards were the worst performing technology in terms of residual votes in presidential elections, 
punch cards were much better than lever machines or full-faced DREs in preserving votes on 
ballot measures. 
However, their analysis was based on only one election year (2004), choosing to study 
elections across 34 states.  Therefore, their analysis might not have fully controlled for the 
potential array of administrative, procedural, legal, and political differences that existed in that 
election over the set of states they study.  In contrast, our panel study’s focus on California 
should shed better light on the causal connection between voting technologies and residual vote 
rates, while also keeping many administrative, procedural, and contextual factors constant (as 
our analysis is restricted to a single state).  
Another important question that has been under-studied is how residual vote rates differ 
by voting mode.  Typically, residual vote studies assume that all of the ballots included in the 
analysis have been cast in identical ways in a county — with the same technology and using the 
same administrative procedures.  While that assumption might not have been problematic in 
2000, when the residual vote rate measure was invented and there were few ballots cast outside 
of polling places on Election Day, administrative practices have changed considerably since 
then.  In some states like Oregon and Washington, all or nearly all ballots are now marked by 
voters before Election Day, outside of the administrative control of election officials, and sent by 
mail. In many other states (California being a prominent example), the number of ballots marked 
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before Election Day and cast by mail has increased dramatically.  In some places, voters can 
even vote before the election in a satellite voting location (“early voting”).   
Voters who mark their ballots outside a polling place or satellite-voting center cannot 
take advantage of technological means to check their marked ballots for common errors, like 
overvotes or undervotes.  Thus, residual vote rates may differ significantly between in-person 
and by-mail ballots.  Jurisdictions with more by-mail voting may have higher residual vote rates, 
all things being equal. 
 
II. Data 
The data from this paper were taken from the publication Statement of Vote, which is compiled 
after each statewide primary and general election by the California Secretary of State.6  These 
data include turnout (termed “total voters” in the report), number of residual votes (usually 
labeled “votes not cast in race”), and voting technology.  When the number of residual votes was 
not reported explicitly, they were calculated by subtracting the number of votes for candidates or 
ballot measures from turnout.  
The unit of analysis is the county-year.  Counties are the appropriate geographic unit of 
analysis, because counties administer statewide elections.  By obtaining data from multiple 
years, we create a panel dataset, which allows us to account for confounding county-specific 
effects in a simple, straightforward way that is described below, and which has been used in 
similar research in the past (Caltech/MIT 2001; Ansolabehere and Stewart 2005; Stewart 2006).   
 We gathered the relevant data for ballot measures, president, U.S. senator, and governor 
for the 1990–2010 period.  We excluded the 1992 special election for U.S. senator, in which 
Diane Feinstein was elected to serve out Pete Wilson’s incomplete term.  We also excluded 
                                                 
6 The URL for these reports is http://www.sos.ca.gov/elections/elections_elections.htm. 
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ballot measures that appeared on primary ballots, because the electorates in those elections are 
significantly different from general elections, even taking into account that the electorates for on- 
and off-year general elections are likely to differ, as well. 
 Table 2 reports the statewide residual vote rates for presidential, gubernatorial, U.S. 
Senate, and proposition elections during this period.  Figure 1 illustrates this data graphically. 
Table 2 about here 
Figure 1 about here 
Overall, the residual vote rates have averaged, 1.7%, 2.8%, and 4.3% for president, 
governor, and senator, respectively.  The presidential and gubernatorial races are at the very top 
of the ballot in on- and off-years, respectively, so there is no surprise that these rates should be 
low.  The U.S. Senate race is never at the top of the ballot and, in mid-terms, can be far down the 
ballot because all statewide positions appear above it.7  Therefore, it is unsurprising that the 
residual vote rate for U.S. Senate is always higher than the top-of-the-ballot races, both overall, 
and in the year-by-year comparison. 
 Table 2 also reports summary statistics for residual votes among the ballot measures, with 
Figure 1 illustrating this information graphically.  The hollow squares in the figure report the 
average rates across all ballot measures, while the “whiskers” report the minimum and maximum 
rates.   
The overall residual vote rate for ballot propositions, 9.3%, is much higher than for the 
three statewide positions studied here, but there is considerable variability around this mean.  
While no proposition has ever had a lower statewide residual vote rate than the concurrent 
                                                 
7 This is established by Section 13109 of California’s Election Code.  This section specifies that presidential and 
state constitutional officers (Governor, Lieutenant Governor, Secretary of State, Controller, Treasurer, Attorney 
General, Insurance Commissioner, and Member of State Board of Equalization) will always precede U.S. Senate 
candidates when presidential or state constitutional officers are on the general election ballot.    
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presidential or gubernatorial election, two propositions had lower statewide residual vote rates 
than the concurrent senatorial election.8   
 
III. Method and Estimation 
The focus in this paper is on the role that voting technologies play in determining the residual 
vote rate in California elections.  The statistical technique used to quantify that role is fixed-
effects regression, which is the technique used by Ansolabehere and Stewart (2005) and Stewart 
(2006) in studies of the residual vote rate nationwide.  The idea behind fixed effects regression is 
that much of the heterogeneity we observe in residual vote rates, both cross sectional and 
longitudinal, can be explained by unobserved factors that are (assumed to be) constant for the 
period of the study.   
In this study, we treat three factors as fixed, and account for them with a series of dummy 
variables:  county, year, and ballot measure.  This is in lieu of searching for measures of 
covariates specifically, which would leave some important confounding variables unmeasured, 
resulting in statistical bias we are trying to avoid.  This strategy also helps with efficiency, which 
is important, because residual vote rates are highly variable, and the technology-related 
influences on them are generally small. 
The county fixed effects take into account demographic and administrative practices that 
are associated with each county — factors which might lead to variations in residual vote rates 
across counties, even in the absence of technology variations.  Counties that have a large number 
                                                 
8 The first was Proposition 187 in 1994, which restricted public services provided to illegal immigrants, with a 3.5% 
residual vote rate, compared to 4.3% for the concurrent senatorial election that pitted Diane Feinstein (D) against 
Michael Huffington (R).  The second was Proposition 86 in 2006, which would have amended the state constitution 
to impose a $2.60 excise tax on cigarettes, which had a 3.8% residual vote rate, compared to 4.0% for the concurrent 
senatorial election that pitted Feinstein against Dick Mountjoy (R).  The residual vote rate for Proposition 8 in 2008, 
which prohibited single-sex marriage in the state, was only 2.5%, but it was still greater than the residual vote rate 
for the presidential election, which was 1.3% in the Obama-McCain contest. 
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of residents who are poorly educated, are less politically engaged, or have poor eyesight are 
likely to have elevated residual vote levels.  In addition, counties that regularly produce ballots 
that are confusing or that poorly inform their voters how to avoid making mistakes may also 
have elevated residual vote levels.  Some of these factors, such as education, may be measurable, 
albeit imprecisely.  Most of these factors will be outside our practical ability to measure.  If we 
do not control for them, we risk both bias and inefficiency.  To minimize these risks, we include 
dummy variables for each county. 
The year fixed effects take into account the fact that numerous factors specific to each 
election year influence the residual vote rate, quite independently of the voting technologies 
used.  For instance, popular incumbents often run for reelection against low-quality challengers; 
the “disadvantaged” party in a year that is considered ex ante to be “bad” for that party (as 1974 
was for Republicans and 2010 for Democrats) may be unable to attract high-quality challengers 
in those years.  In these cases, the asymmetry in candidate quality may lead to partisans from the 
party of the low-quality candidate simply to abstain, rather than support either a candidate whose 
views they do not endorse (the incumbent) or a candidate they do not believe can do the job (the 
challenger).  In other cases, the presence of a strong third party candidate may induce a few 
voters who would otherwise have abstained to make the unconventional choice.  In each of these 
cases, the residual vote rate will expand and contract because of variations in deliberate 
abstentions.  The inclusion of year-specific dummy variables will account for fluctuations in the 
residual vote rate that are due primarily to the candidates standing for election, making our 
estimates of the technology effects more precise. 
The proposition effects similarly take into account factors specific to each ballot measure 
that influence the tendency to abstain.  Previous research suggests that particular types of ballot 
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measures tend to have higher residual vote rates than others.  In particular, referenda placed on 
the ballot by state legislatures tend to have higher residual vote rates than citizen initiatives 
(Mueller 1969; Magleby 1984; Bowler et al. 1992; Kimball and Kropf 2008).  In addition, 
initiatives and referenda vary considerably in how easily they are understood by the average 
voter, and therefore in how often voters abstain due to uncertainty or confusion.  To take into 
account the tendency of some ballot measures to prompt more abstentions than others, we 
include a separate dummy variable for each measure.  Because the ballot measure dummies are 
collinear with the year dummies, we omit the year dummies in the analysis of the ballot 
measures.  
 With the fixed effects providing estimates of the baseline residual vote rates, we focus on 
three other factors, which vary across counties and across time — voting technology, turnout, 
and the prevalence of vote-by-mail.  We describe each in turn. 
 
Voting technology 
We measure voting technology two ways.  First, we use a series of dummy variables to indicate 
whether county c used one of six different types of voting technology in year t.  These 
technology types are central-scan optical scanning, precinct-scan optical scanning, direct 
recording electronic (DRE), Votomatic punch card, DataVote punch card, and InkaVote.9  
                                                 
9 The Statement of Vote document does a thorough job in describing which voting technology each county used for 
the entire period covered by this paper.  It does not indicate whether votes were tallied in the precincts or centrally, 
for those counties that used optical scanners.  Unfortunately, many of the optical scanners used in California may be 
used both in precincts and centrally, so we could not code the type of optical scanner directly from the Secretary of 
State’s document.  Instead, we relied on two documents to piece together whether optical scanning equipment was 
used in-precinct or centrally:  Arnold (1999) and the 2008 Election Assistance Commission Election Administration 
and Voting Survey dataset. 
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Votomatic punch cards — the technology used by the most voters during this period — are the 
omitted category.  Table 3 reports the usage of the equipment, by year. 
[Table 3 about here] 
 One technology type, the InkaVote, deserves special comment.10  InkaVote was adopted 
by Los Angeles County beginning in 2003.  Although technically an optical scan system, its 
design was an adaptation of the Votomatic punch card technology that Los Angeles County 
previously used.  We have chosen not to fold the InkaVote into the central-count optical scan 
category for two reasons.  First, the InkaVote really is a hybrid.  Unlike the other optical 
scanning technologies, the InkaVote ballot is first placed in a vote recorder, like the Votomatic.  
The ballot is then marked like the old Votomatic system was, with a felt-tipped pen replacing the 
stylus.  Therefore, the InkaVote interface is fundamentally different from the other optical scan 
technologies.  Second, because Los Angeles County has begun a process to assess whether the 
InkaVote system should be replaced, it is natural to ask how its unique system fares in 
comparison with the other standard voting technologies (LACRR 2010). 
 As noted, we distinguish between optical scanners that were used to tabulate votes in the 
precinct from those that were used centrally.  Kimball and Kropf (2008) and others have shown 
that precinct-scanned machines tend to have lower residual vote rates than central-scanners in 
presidential balloting, though they did not find the same effect for down-ballot races.  They also 
find that optical ballot styles that require voters to fill in ovals tend to have lower residual vote 
rates in presidential voting than ballots that require voters to complete the point and fletching of 
                                                 
10 Throughout this paper we use the term “InkaVote” to describe the voting system that Los Angeles County uses.  
The system is also called “InkaVote Plus”, a term used today to describe the enhanced version of “InkaVote” now 
used by Los Angeles County that includes the vote recorder, a precinct ballot reader that scans ballots for mistakes 
like overvotes and blank ballots, and an audio ballot booth that can be used for voters who desire to use audio 
equipment to assist them as they mark their ballot. 
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an arrow.  Again, Kimball and Kropf find much weaker effects when it comes to initiatives.  
Because we were unable to collect sample ballots for all counties for the period covered in this 
paper, we were unable to code this attribute of voting systems.  We assume that most of the “oval 
vs.  arrow” effect will be captured in the county fixed effects. 
 Finally, Kimball and Kropf (2008) tested differences between full-face DREs and 
machines with smaller screens that require voters to scroll through the ballot.  None of the DREs 
used in California during this period were full-face, therefore we are unable to test that 
distinction here. 
 We measure technology a second way, by entering a dummy variable equal to one in an 
election year in which a county first uses a particular voting machine, zero otherwise.  Although 
intuition would suggest that the introduction of a new voting technology would tend to increase 
the residual vote rate, due to an increase in voter confusion, Ansolabehere and Stewart (2005) 
found that the effect was just the opposite — the introduction of new voting technologies tends 
to decrease the residual vote rate in top-of-the-ballot races.  However, there has been no research 
into whether the extra effort at voter education that usually surrounds the introduction of new 
voting equipment similarly leads to reduced residual vote rates among ballot propositions.  
Therefore, we enter this second dummy variable to test these effects in this context. 
 
Turnout 
One of the hypotheses to explain the longitudinal fluctuation in residual vote rates is that the 
surge of voters to the polls in particularly “hot” election years brings more inexperienced voters 
to the polls, thus producing more residual votes.  Ansolabehere and Stewart (2005) found 
precisely this effect, when they controlled for the underlying size of the election administration 
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unit.  To control for the turnout surge effect on the residual vote rate, we include the natural 
logarithm of turnout for county c in election year t. 
 
Vote-by-mail 
One factor that has been virtually overlooked in previous studies of the effect of voting 
technology on residual votes is the effect of voting by mail.  Almost every study of residual vote 
rates has implicitly assumed that all voters are using the in-precinct voting machines to cast 
ballots, despite the fact that an increasing number of voters are using the mails to vote, rather 
than going to a polling place on Election Day (Gronke, Stewart, and Hicks 2010).11  California is 
one state where the trend toward vote-by-mail has been swiftest.  During the period covered by 
this paper, the percentage of ballots cast by mail has risen from 18% in 1990 to 48% in 2010.  
California has adopted a “permanent absentee” provision and has ceased using the term 
“absentee voting” to label voting by mail.  Alpine County has voted entirely by mail in general 
elections since 1994, as has Sierra County since 2004. 
 The assumption that all ballots in a county are cast in-precinct is problematic in 
estimating the effect of voting technology on the residual vote rate for several reasons.  First, the 
voting technology used to cast and tabulate mail ballots can be different in the two modes.  This 
is particularly true when a county uses a DRE for its polling place method, because it must use 
an optical scanning technology to handle the absentee ballots.  Even when optical scanning is the 
in-precinct method, if a county uses in-precinct counting of polling place ballots, the ballot 
interface for mail-in ballots may be the same, but the counting technique will be different, 
because the mail-in ballots are counted centrally.  Even when the same technology is used for in-
                                                 
11 There are few studies of residual vote rates for any form of convenience voting method.  For example, in a recent 
review essay regarding convenience voting, Gronke et al. (2008) noted “It therefore remains unknown whether 
ballots that are cast earlier are generally of higher quality (that is, have lower levels of residual votes)” (p. 448). 
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precinct and absentee voting, the election process in the two settings will be quite different in 
any event, and it would be a mistake to estimate the effect of machines on the residual vote rate 
without taking this into account. 
 It would be ideal to estimate the residual vote rate separately for voters using the two 
main voting modes in California, in-precinct and vote-by-mail.  However, only a few counties 
report the residual vote rates for in-precinct vs. vote-by-mail modes separately; none report this 
for the whole period covered by this paper.  As an alternative, we have entered in the percentage 
of ballots cast by mail for county c in election year t as a control variable. 12 
 
III.  Results 
Table 4 reports the results of the estimation, comparing residual vote rates of presidential, 
gubernatorial, and senatorial elections with those of the ballot measures voted on in these same 
statewide elections.13  To help focus on the coefficients associated with voting technologies, 
Figure 2 graphs the values of the voting technology coefficients, along with error bars that depict 
the 95% confidence intervals.  The top half of the graph groups the coefficients first by voting 
technology, then by race; the bottom half groups first by race, then by voting technology.  The 
Votomatic punch card, the baseline category, is indicated with the horizontal line at zero along 
the y-axis. 
[Table 4 about here] 
[Figure 2 about here] 
                                                 
12 Better still would be to interact the percentage of vote-by-mail voting with the dummy variables indicating the in-
precinct voting technology, to see if the mail-in ballot effect varies across the different voting technologies.  
Unfortunately, the results we obtained were very imprecise, so we confine ourselves here to simply estimating the 
direct effect of vote-by-mail. 
13 Because only one county that comprise a tiny fraction of the state’s voters used mechanical lever machines in the 
1990 and 1992 elections, we omit a discussion of those results. 
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 The results for the three races, president, governor, and senator, are similar to those found 
in other nationwide studies.  A switch from Votomatic punch cards to central-count optical 
scanning resulted in a reduction in the residual vote rate of between 0.7 and 1.3 percentage points 
for presidential, gubernatorial, and senatorial races.  The effect of going from Votomatic punch 
cards to precinct-count optical scanning is quantitatively similar.  A switch to precinct-count 
optical scanning in this case reduced the residual vote rate by 0.9 percentage points for president, 
1.5 percentage points for governor, and 1.0 percentage points for senator. 
 For counties that abandoned Votomatic punch cards in favor of DRE’s, the results are 
similar, although the residual vote rate reductions are on the whole smaller and less precisely 
estimated.  The effect of moving from Votomatic punch cards to DREs is not statistically 
different from zero (at traditional levels of significance) in the case of presidential elections. 
Moving to DREs resulted in a residual vote rate reduction of around 1.4 percentage points in 
gubernatorial elections.  The sign on the coefficient is also negative for senatorial elections, but 
the standard error is larger than the coefficient. 
 The InkaVote system yielded improvements in the case of presidential and gubernatorial 
elections that were similar to precinct-count optical scan systems.  The estimated reduction in 
residual vote rates for these two types of races in Los Angeles County were 0.9 percentage points 
in each case.  However, the results also suggest that InkaVote may be associated with an 
increase in the residual vote rate in senatorial elections, although the standard error is large 
enough that we could only reject the null hypothesis at p < .07. 
As an aside, the coefficients associated with the DataVote punch cards also indicate that 
these machines, which were also banned by HAVA, produced residual vote rate at roughly the 
same levels as the more modern technologies.  Therefore, for the voters in the twenty-one 
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counties that were required to relinquish DataVote punch cards after 2000, there is evidence that 
HAVA was a mixed blessing, in terms of lost votes, because some counties were required to 
adopt voting machines that were no better on the residual vote measure.  On the whole, the 
DataVote coefficients are very similar to coefficients associated with optical scanning and DREs. 
 Overall, all the optical scanning technologies, including InkaVote, showed a significant 
residual vote rate improvement in the presidential and gubernatorial elections, while counties 
that adopted DREs to replace Votomatics only clearly showed improvements in the gubernatorial 
elections.  Only the optical scanning technologies showed clear improvement with the down-
ballot U.S. Senate elections and, indeed, the InkaVote system performed less well than the old 
Votomatic punch cards.   
Turning now to the results pertaining to ballot measures, we see substantial 
improvements in residual vote rates from both types of optical scanning and DRE systems, and 
only a small improvement from InkaVote.  Los Angeles County reduced its proposition residual 
vote rates by 0.42 percentage points, an improvement only one-quarter to one-fifth the size of the 
improvement for counties that moved to the other new technologies. 
Overall, the effects of the voting technology changes in California during the past decade 
have been consistent.  Counties moving to optical scanning have seen a definite drop in the 
residual vote rate in top-of-the-ballot races, and an even more significant drop in the residual 
vote rate for propositions.  The effect of technology change on the residual vote rate for senator 
— a race nearer the bottom of the ballot— is decidedly mixed. For the InkaVote, the results have 
also been mixed, showing substantial improvements in presidential and gubernatorial elections, 
possible deterioration in U.S. Senate elections, and only a small improvement for ballot 
measures.  
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Table 4 also reports estimates for the effects of adopting new voting technology 
(regardless of the technology employed), the rise of vote-by-mail, and fluctuations in turnout.  
The adoption of new technologies was not related to any change in the residual vote rate in the 
case of president, senator, or propositions, only having the hypothesize effect in the case of 
governor.  The turnout fluctuation effects are also statistically insignificant among the three 
offices and ballot propositions.  
 An especially interesting result reported in Table 4 pertains to the vote-by-mail 
coefficient, which is positive and statistically significant in each estimation.  The interpretation 
of the coefficient is straightforward — it represents the estimated change in the residual vote rate 
if a county moves from no voting by mail to complete vote-by-mail.  The size of the vote-by-
mail coefficient is larger than the size of the coefficient for any voting technology.  
 Because the vote-by-mail coefficient is always large and positive while the coefficients 
associated with most new voting technologies in most settings are negative, this suggests that the 
lost votes recovered by California through the modernization of voting technologies may be 
being undone by the trend toward more voting by mail. 
 To test this supposition, Table 5 attempts to quantify changes in the residual vote rate in 
each county from the presidential elections of 1992 to 2008 due to changes in voting 
technologies and due to the growth in voting by mail.  The table starts by reporting turnout in the 
1992 and 2008 presidential elections; the percentage of ballots cast by mail in 1992 and 2008, 
along with the change across the two years; the type of voting equipment used in 1992 and 2008; 
and the estimated change in the residual vote rate from 1992 and 2008 based on changes in 
voting technology, using the coefficients from Table 4.  It then calculates the estimated number 
of votes represented by this coefficient by multiplying it by turnout for 2008.  Negative values 
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indicate an estimated reduction in the residual vote in 2008 due to technology changes since 
1992.  For instance, for Alameda County, we estimate that the change from punch cards in 1992 
to precinct-count optical scanning in 2008 resulted in a reduction in the number of residual votes 
in 2008 by 5,343 (≈ -0.85% × 628,545).  
[Table 5 about here] 
 We then estimate the number of residual votes due to changes in the vote-by-mail rate in 
presidential elections by multiplying the relevant coefficient in Table 4 by the change in the 
vote-by-mail rate and the turnout for 2008.  For instance, for Alameda County, we estimate that 
the growth in the vote-by-mail rate from 12.7% in 1992 to 48.3% in 2008 resulted in an increase 
in the number of residual votes in 2008 by 4,925 (≈ .022 × [48.3%-12.7%] × 628,545). 
 On net, improvements in voting technology roughly counterbalance the rise of residual 
votes due to the growth in vote-by-mail in presidential elections.  The estimated effect of the 
voting technology improvements since 1992 is a reduction in the number of residual votes in the 
2008 presidential election of 88,173; the vote-by-mail trend, on the other hand, has produced an 
increase in the number of residual votes of 73,868.  That nets out to a decrease in residual votes 
in presidential elections of 14,305, or an overall decrease in the residual vote rate of  0.10 
percentage points due to these two changes in election administration in California.  
 
VI.  Discussion and conclusions 
This paper has built on prior research to estimate how voting technologies have affected the “lost 
vote problem” in California over the past two decades.  Like the studies that began the analysis 
of residual votes post-2000, we employed a panel data set to estimate the impact of changing 
voting technologies on the residual vote rate.  Unlike past studies, we added two wrinkles.  First, 
we added analysis of the rise of vote-by-mail, which has been the other major change in how the 
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electorate votes, especially in the west, since 2000.  Second, we added analysis of elections 
beyond the presidential election, comparing across three major statewide races (president, 
governor, and U.S. senate) and the very significant set of ballot propositions that also dominate 
the politics of the Golden State. 
 The part of this paper that is parallel with past research produced similar findings to that 
earlier research, particularly in answering the core question of whether changing voting 
technologies can help address the problem of lost votes due to voting technologies.  In 
California’s presidential elections over the past two decades, counties that have abandoned 
punch cards in favor of optical scanning have enjoyed a significant improvement in the residual 
vote rate, which was the primary goal of the Help America Vote Act’s mandated retirement of 
these older technologies.  Among these counties, the effect was the addition of almost 32,000 
additional votes to the tally in 2008.  The effect of Los Angeles County’s adoption of the 
InkaVote system can be credited with the addition of another 30,000 additional votes in the 
statewide tally.  That increase is the equivalent of adding a county the size of Nevada County to 
California.14 
 The added features of this paper bring greater nuance to past findings.  First, we show 
that findings that pertain to the presidential election do not necessarily translate to other races, 
either prominent ones near the top of the ballot, or potentially arcane ones among the ballot 
propositions.  As far as voting technologies are concerned, there is a consistent finding that 
abandoning Votomatic punch cards in favor of optical scanning has produced an unambiguous 
increase in counted votes.  The InkaVote system for Los Angeles has been a mixed success, 
performing very well in presidential and gubernatorial races, fairly well for ballot propositions, 
                                                 
14 Nevada County is approximately the median county in California, by voter turnout. 
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and poorly in Senate races.  Statistically speaking, DREs prove no better than punch cards in 
presidential and senatorial elections, but much better than them in gubernatorial races and ballot 
propositions.  With only one county in our dataset using mechanical lever machines and for only 
one election, we cannot draw any conclusions about the historical use of that technology in 
California. 
 We also conducted the first analysis of the effects of the rise of vote-by-mail in a residual 
vote context, and here we find trends that should cause election reformers pause.  Regardless of 
the race, increasing the percentage of voters in a county using the mail to vote is robustly 
associated with a rise in the residual vote rate in that county.  The effect is so strong that we 
estimate that the rise of voting by mail has mostly wiped out all the reductions in residual votes 
that were due to improved voting technologies since the early 1990s. 
These findings have implications for policymaking in California, of course, but they also 
have implications for thinking about the most important issues in how elections are run 
throughout the United States.  In particular, they are relevant to considering the trade-off 
between accuracy and convenience.  Ever since election administration became more salient 
following the 2000 presidential election, the debate has often focused on accuracy and 
convenience.15  Because it was a key feature of the Florida controversy in 2000, the issue of the 
accuracy of voting machines, broadly considered, has been well-studied and the subject of 
important state, local, and federal legislation since 2000.  As reported here and elsewhere, the 
result has been to improve significantly the accuracy of the voting experience for average voters 
since 2000.  Greater convenience in voting, such as making vote-by-mail easier, clearly benefits 
                                                 
15 Accuracy touches on issues like ballot design and other factors affecting the voting interface and the use of 
machines, rather than human beings, to count ballots.  Convenience touches on issues like whether to have early 
voting, to use vote centers, and whether to make it easier to vote by mail. 
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existing voters if we measure the benefit in terms of time spent voting.  And many studies have 
focused on the convenience of voting by mail.  (See the summary of this literature in Alvarez, 
Levin and Sinclair 2011.)  The findings in this paper suggest that this convenience comes at a 
cost, which is a significantly greater chance that the vote will not be counted once it is received 
at the county election office. Yet the costs of convenience have not been subjected to the same 
degree of skeptical, scientific scrutiny, and the results here suggest they should be.   If we 
combine this with the significantly greater likelihood that mail ballots may not be received by the 
county election office in time to be counted in the first place (Stewart 2011b; Alvarez, Hall and 
Sinclair 2008), there are serious questions about whether the cost of convenience is good for the 
functioning of the electoral system. 
 This is not to say that the rise of the vote-by-mail system is unambiguously bad, just that 
its full array of costs and benefits have not been subjected to the necessary scrutiny.  If nothing 
else, we hope that this paper will prompt further research into the matter. 
 While this paper extends previous analysis in new directions, it opens up new research 
that should be done to verify and hone its findings.  In particular, the effect of the rise of vote-by-
mail has been estimated here using an aggregate measure of how many voters in each county 
vote absentee in each election.  A more accurate way of estimating this effect would be to study 
separately the residual vote rate in each county, separating ballots received by mail from ballots 
cast in person (either on election day or in early voting.)  Unfortunately, few California counties 
currently report election returns this way, and we will be unable to make much more progress on 
this question until they do.  In a related fashion, some studies (Kousser and Mullin 2007, 
Bergman and Yates 2009) attempt to take advantage of provisions in California law that require 
some voters in certain precincts to vote by mail in a quasi-random fashion to estimate the effect 
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of vote-by-mail on turnout, using a “natural experiment” design.  It would be quite possible to 
extend these studies to have the residual vote rates of these ballots compared against a matched 
sample of precincts in which voters were not required to vote by mail. 
Finally, the results of this paper have implications for the current question in the largest 
electoral jurisdiction in America, Los Angeles County, about the future of its election system.  
First, InkaVote has been a mixed blessing.  It has reduced the number of lost votes in presidential 
elections, but considering the lopsided margins California has given Democratic presidential 
candidates over the past decade, this improvement has had little impact on the actual vote 
outcome.  The statewide races tend to be closer and, of course, are state offices.  Therefore, Los 
Angeles County voters have more at stake.  For these statewide races, InkaVote ranges from 
being as good as conventional optical scanning systems to being no better than the discredited 
Votomatic punch cards.   
Second, the results of this paper suggest that in order to fully assess the quality of a 
voting technology it is important to assess it at various levels of the ballot.  What one finds at the 
very top will not necessarily be found at the bottom.  This suggests that as Los Angeles County 
assesses the usability of a new system, officials should not simply stop at making sure the new 
system helps voters cast their intended vote in high-profile races.  
 Third, the results in this paper suggest that Los Angeles County, along with other 
counties, should hesitate before encouraging more residents to vote by mail.  Admittedly, the 
results concerning voting by mail are preliminary and based on a blunt estimation technique, but 
the results are surprisingly clear nonetheless:  more voting by mail is associated with more 
residual votes.  If the goal is to ensure that every vote counts, measures that increase the 
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convenience of in-precinct voting would be much superior to those that encourage a new surge in 
mail-in balloting. 
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Table 1.  Pre-2000 studies on ballot roll-off 
 
Citation 
Geographic 
coverage Offices studied Year(s) Baseline for turnout Finding 
White (1960) Michigan Referendum 1958 Vote for governor Lever machines had 
higher roll-off 
Mather (1964) Iowa Top vote-getter; 
Referenda 
1920-1960 Eligible electorate; 
votes cast for race 
with most total votes 
Paper-ballot counties 
had higher turnout; 
Lever machines had 
higher roll-off 
Thomas (1968) Michigan Referenda 1958-1963 Total votes for 
partisan office 
receiving the most 
total votes on ballot 
Lever machines had 
higher roll-off 
Asher, 
Schussler, and 
Rosenfield 
(1982) 
Ohio Governor 
(primarily) and 
other down-
ballot state races 
1974–1980 Turnout Punch cards cause more 
lost votes at top of 
ballot, but many fewer 
down-ballot 
Montgomery 
(1982)* 
Michigan Special elections Unknown Unknown Punch cards experience 
more “vote loss” 
Fraser (1985) Ohio All statewide 
contests 
1974-1982 Turnout Punch card have higher 
roll-off for governor; 
machines have higher 
roll-off down-ballot, 
including referenda 
Mather (1986) Iowa Top vote-getter; 
Referenda 
1920–1984 Eligible electorate; 
votes cast for race 
with most total votes 
Paper-ballot counties 
had higher turnout; 
Lever machines had 
higher roll-off 
Darcy and 
Schneider 
(1989) 
Oklahoma All statewide 
contests 
1986 Presumably turnout Opscan ballots with 
“confusing” layouts 
experience more roll-
off; otherwise, opscan 
ballots have less roll-off 
Nichols and 
Strikek (1995) 
Columbus, 
Ohio 
Federal, state, & 
county offices 
1992 Votes cast for 
president 
Electronic voting 
machines produce less 
roll-off, except for U.S. 
Senate 
Nichols (1998) Kentucky Constitutional 
referenda 
1992, 1996 Votes cast in “major 
partisan office” 
Electronic voting 
machines produce less 
roll-off in referenda 
 
*Cited in Shocket, Heighberger, and Brown (1992). 
Table 2.  Residual vote rates for president, U.S. Senate, and ballot measures, 1992 – 2008, and governor, 1990–2010. 
 
Candidates  Ballot measures 
Pres. Gov. Sen.  All Measure with lowest resid. vote rate Measure with highest resid. vote rate 
Election 
year 
Resid. 
Vote 
Rate 
Resid. 
Vote 
Rate 
Resid. 
Vote 
Rate 
 
Number 
of 
measures 
Avg. 
Resid. 
Vote 
Rate   No. Official title 
Resid. 
Vote 
Rate   No. Official title 
Resid. 
Vote 
Rate 
1990 --- 2.5% ---  28 9.8%  128 Environment. Public Health. Bonds. 
Initiative Statute 
6.4%  141 Toxic Chemical Discharge. Public 
Agencies. Legislative Statute (Senate 
Bill 65, Statutes of 1990, Chapter 
407) 
13.0% 
1992 2.1% --- 5.1%  13 9.8%  161 Physician-Assisted Death. Terminal 
Condition. 
6.8%  159 Office of the Auditor General. 14.9% 
1994 --- 2.6% 4.3%  10 9.7%  187 Illegal Aliens. Ineligibility for Public 
Services. Verification and Reporting. 
3.5%  191 Abolish Justice Courts 18.8% 
1996 2.4% --- ---  15 8.4%  215 Medical Use of Marijuana. 5.6%  216 Health Care. Consumer Protection. 
Taxes on Corporate Restructuring. 
11.0% 
1998 --- 2.7% 3.5%  12 10.5%  5 Tribal-State Gaming Compacts. 
Tribal Casinos. 
5.3%  11 Local Sales and Use Taxes--Revenue 
Sharing 
15.2% 
2000 1.6% --- 4.7%  8 10.1%  38 School Vouchers. State-Funded 
Private and Religious Education. 
Public Funding. 
5.8%  37 Fees. Vote Requirements. Taxes. 13.6% 
2002 --- 3.4% ---  7 9.8%  47 Kindergarten-University Public 
Education Facilities Bond Act of 
2002. 
7.6%  48 Court Consolidation 14.0% 
2004 1.3% --- 4.3%  16 10.2%  71 Stem Cell Research. Funding. 
Bonds. Initiative Constitutional 
Amendment and Statute 
5.6%  65 Local Government Funds, Revenues. 
State Mandates. 
17.6% 
2006 --- 2.5% 4.0%  13 6.1%  86 Tax on Cigarettes. Initiative 
Constitutional Amendment and 
Statute. 
3.8%  84 Water Quality, Safety and Supply. 
Flood Control. Natural Resource 
Protection. Park Improvements. 
Bonds. Initiative 
7.4% 
2008 1.3% --- ---  12 8.1%  8 Eliminates Right of Same-Sex 
Couples to Marry. Initiative 
Constitutional Amendment. 
2.5%  11 Redistricting. Initiative 
Constitutional Amendment and 
Statute. 
12.7% 
2010 --- 2.0% 2.9%  9 7.4%  19 Legalizes Marijuana under 
California but not Federal Law. 
3.2%  27 Eliminates State Commission on 
Redistricting. 
10.6% 
 
 
Figure 1.  Graph of values from Table 1. 
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Table 3.  Use of voting technologies in California, by number of voters and number of counties, 1992–2010 
  
 
 
 
Mechanical 
lever  Punch, Votomatic  Punch, Datavote  Optical scan, central count  
Optical scan, precinct 
count  DRE  InkaVote 
Year Voters Cnty  Voters Cnty  Voters Cnty  Voters Cnty  Voters Cnty  Voters Cnty  Voters Cnty 
1990 34,669 1  4,891,264 17  1,963,447 31  1,009,751 9  0 0  0 0  0 0 
1992 49,958 1  6,951,797 15  2,492,252 29  1,583,075 11  297,483 2  0 0  0 0 
1994 0 0  5,313,966 13  1,941,102 28  1,411,849 15  233,715 2  0 0  0 0 
1996 0 0  6,112,148 12  2,117,080 28  1,708,631 15  325,653 3  0 0  0 0 
1998 0 0  5,092,521 12  1,786,994 28  1,466,862 15  271,272 3  0 0  0 0 
2000 0 0  5,947,871 9  2,033,175 21  1,150,538 11  1,556,182 16  455,077 1  0 0 
2002 0 0  3,636,190 8  1,441,440 20  858,540 11  1,138,167 16  664,484 3  0 0 
2004 0 0  0 0  601,657 12  2,547,851 11  2,763,319 24  3,592,454 10  3,085,582 1 
2006 0 0  0 0  0 0  387,481 8  2,893,092 27  3,585,367 22  2,033,119 1 
2008 0 0  0 0  0 0  6,131,091 29  4,244,029 28  1,475,007 2  3,368,057 1 
2010 0 0  0 0  0 0  3,645,053 28  3,155,702 27  1,124,464 2  2,377,105 1 
Table 4.  Fixed effects regressions.  (Standard errors in parentheses) 
 President Governor Senator Propositions 
Voting machine     
Votomatic punch 
card 
Omitted category Omitted category Omitted category Omitted category
Datavote punch 
card 
-0.0055 
(0.0020) 
-0.016 
(0.002) 
-0.013 
(0.003) 
-0.025 
(0.001) 
Optical scan, 
central count 
-0.0068 
(0.0021) 
-0.013 
(0.002) 
 -0.011 
(0.003) 
-0.022 
(0.001) 
Optical scan, 
precinct count 
-0.0085 
(0.0022) 
-0.015 
(0.002) 
-0.0099 
(0.0033) 
-0.027 
(0.001) 
  DRE -0.0047 
(0.0025) 
-0.014 
(0.002) 
-0.0034 
(0.0035) 
-0.027 
(0.001) 
  Lever machine -0.0091 
(0.0133) 
-0.0028 
(0.0130) 
0.033 
(0.021) 
0.016 
(0.005) 
  Inkavote -0.0089 
(0.0025) 
-0.0087 
(0.0024) 
0.0068 
(0.0037) 
-0.0042 
(0.0010) 
County adopted 
new technology 
0.0014 
(0.0012) 
-0.0032 
(0.0014) 
-0.0011 
(0.0017) 
-0.00072 
(0.00049) 
Vote-by-mail 
pct. 
0.022 
(0.010) 
0.033 
(0.008) 
0.049 
(0.014) 
0.030 
(0.004) 
log(turnout) -0.0057 
(0.0107) 
0.0016 
(0.0075) 
0.0091 
(0.0138) 
-0.0020 
(0.0033) 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes No 
County dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Proposition 
dummies 
n/a n/a n/a Yes 
N 290 348 406 8,294 
R2 .66 .73 .63 .88 
Adj. R2 .55 .67 .56 .88 
Root M.S.E. 0.0060 0.0058 0.010 0.013 
 
 
Coefficients not reported:  Intercept, year dummies, county dummies, and proposition dummies.
Figure 2.  Comparison of voting-technology-related coefficients from Table 4. 
 
a.  By method 
 
 
 
 
 
b.  By office 
 
 
D = Datavote, C = Central-count optical scan, P = Precinct-count optical scan, E = DRE, L = 
Mechanical lever machine, I = InkaVote 
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Table 5.  Calculation of net change in residual vote rate from 1992 to 2010, combining effects of 
voting technology and vote-by-mail. 
 
Turnout Vote-by-Mail Pct. Voting equipment type 
Voting technology 
effect 
Vote-by-
Mail Effect 
Combined 
effect 
County 1992 2008 1992 2008 Change 1992 2008 
Net rv 
change pct 
Net 
votes Net votes Net votes 
Alameda 541,928 628,545 12.7% 48.3% 35.6% Punch Opscan-P -0.85% -5,343      4,925 -418 
Alpine 638 697 22.1% 100.0% 77.9% Punch Opscan-C -0.68% -5           12 7 
Amador 15,692 19,006 16.5% 51.8% 35.4% Opscan-C Opscan-P -0.17% -32         148 116 
Butte 88,446 99,392 18.0% 49.4% 31.5% Punch Opscan-C -0.68% -676         688 12 
Calaveras 17,516 23,588 24.7% 58.5% 33.8% Punch Opscan-P -0.85% -200         176 -25 
Colusa 5,860 6,532 19.7% 49.3% 29.6% Punch Opscan-P -0.85% -56           43 -13 
Contra Costa 389,391 456,876 19.7% 47.6% 27.9% Opscan-C Opscan-P -0.17% -777      2,805 2,028 
Del Norte 9,687 9,684 27.5% 48.4% 20.9% Punch Opscan-C -0.68% -66           45 -21 
El Dorado 66,949 93,890 19.8% 54.7% 34.9% Punch Opscan-P -0.85% -798         722 -76 
Fresno 224,241 275,554 18.6% 45.3% 26.7% Punch Opscan-P -0.85% -2,342      1,618 -724 
Glenn 9,143 10,053 14.5% 36.8% 22.2% Punch Opscan-C -0.68% -68           49 -19 
Humboldt 61,030 64,358 17.2% 40.6% 23.5% Punch Opscan-P -0.85% -547         332 -215 
Imperial 27,597 39,823 12.0% 32.3% 20.2% Punch Opscan-C -0.68% -271         177 -94 
Inyo 8,588 8,625 18.7% 43.2% 24.5% Punch Opscan-C -0.68% -59           47 -12 
Kern 185,781 235,854 14.1% 41.2% 27.1% Punch Opscan-C -0.68% -1,604      1,405 -199 
Kings 26,326 35,775 15.7% 64.2% 48.6% Punch Opscan-C -0.68% -243         382 139 
Lake 24,035 25,863 20.5% 53.3% 32.8% Opscan-C Opscan-C 0.00% 0         186 186 
Lassen 10,510 11,510 15.6% 44.2% 28.6% Punch Opscan-P -0.85% -98           72 -25 
Los Angeles 2,831,077 3,368,057 13.7% 24.1% 10.3% Punch InkaVote -0.89% -29,976      7,652 -22,324 
Madera 31,222 43,032 18.4% 54.0% 35.6% Opscan-C Opscan-C 0.00% 0         337 337 
Marin 132,422 141,321 19.2% 58.7% 39.5% Punch Opscan-P -0.85% -1,201      1,228 27 
Mariposa 8,469 9,756 24.8% 55.3% 30.4% Opscan-C Opscan-C 0.00% 0           65 65 
Mendocino 37,658 40,580 15.2% 22.2% 7.0% Punch Opscan-C -0.68% -276           62 -213 
Merced 49,958 64,688 16.0% 40.3% 24.3% Mechanical Opscan-P 0.06% 39         346 385 
Modoc 4,702 4,505 18.2% 31.8% 13.6% Punch Opscan-P -0.85% -38           14 -25 
Mono 4,499 5,621 17.7% 33.7% 16.0% Punch Opscan-P -0.85% -48           20 -28 
Monterey 118,303 131,381 24.9% 58.8% 33.9% Punch Opscan-C -0.68% -893         980 86 
Napa 55,090 60,366 17.2% 27.5% 10.3% Punch Opscan-C -0.68% -410         137 -273 
Nevada 45,414 56,177 23.6% 69.5% 45.9% Opscan-C Opscan-P -0.17% -96         567 471 
Orange 979,024 1,167,657 15.4% 46.5% 31.1% Punch DRE -0.47% -5,488      7,989 2,501 
Placer 93,438 175,215 23.4% 55.6% 32.2% Punch Opscan-P -0.85% -1,489      1,239 -250 
Plumas 10,521 11,169 23.0% 58.7% 35.8% Punch Opscan-P -0.85% -95           88 -7 
Riverside 434,316 657,005 18.1% 41.5% 23.5% Opscan-C Opscan-C 0.00% 0      3,392 3,392 
Sacramento 461,887 546,660 14.6% 44.2% 29.6% Punch Opscan-P -0.85% -4,647      3,560 -1,087 
San Benito 13,207 19,982 19.1% 43.3% 24.2% Punch Opscan-C -0.68% -136         106 -29 
San Bernardino 482,162 616,320 14.8% 37.2% 22.4% Punch Opscan-C -0.68% -4,191      3,042 -1,149 
38 
 
Turnout Vote-by-Mail Pct. Voting equipment type 
Voting technology 
effect 
Vote-by-
Mail Effect 
Combined 
effect 
County 1992 2008 1992 2008 Change 1992 2008 
Net rv 
change pct 
Net 
votes Net votes Net votes 
San Diego 1,002,914 1,245,947 24.4% 46.0% 21.6% Punch Opscan-C -0.68% -8,472      5,926 -2,546 
San Francisco 329,695 388,112 22.6% 46.0% 23.4% Punch Opscan-P -0.85% -3,299      1,996 -1,303 
San Joaquin 165,909 212,214 18.4% 48.0% 29.6% Opscan-C Opscan-C 0.00% 0      1,381 1,381 
San Luis Obispo 107,144 134,061 23.9% 51.0% 27.1% Punch Opscan-P -0.85% -1,140         800 -339 
San Mateo 281,791 307,350 20.2% 48.1% 27.8% Opscan-C DRE 0.21% 645      1,883 2,529 
Santa Barbara 164,705 176,562 22.2% 52.2% 30.0% Opscan-C Opscan-P -0.17% -300      1,164 864 
Santa Clara 610,002 678,033 13.5% 57.3% 43.8% Punch Opscan-C -0.68% -4,611      6,534 1,923 
Santa Cruz 116,527 128,555 20.3% 47.1% 26.8% Punch Opscan-P -0.85% -1,093         757 -336 
Shasta 69,223 81,378 15.0% 51.8% 36.8% Punch Opscan-C -0.68% -553         659 106 
Sierra 1,918 2,012 21.3% 100.0% 78.7% Punch Opscan-C -0.68% -14           35 21 
Siskiyou 21,428 21,723 18.1% 61.3% 43.2% Punch Opscan-P -0.85% -185         206 22 
Solano 134,444 162,638 16.1% 51.1% 35.0% Punch Opscan-P -0.85% -1,382      1,253 -130 
Sonoma 201,499 231,817 20.1% 59.4% 39.3% Opscan-C Opscan-C 0.00% 0      2,005 2,005 
Stanislaus 131,398 162,941 31.1% 52.9% 21.8% Punch Opscan-P -0.85% -1,385         782 -603 
Sutter 26,456 33,337 23.9% 68.3% 44.4% Opscan-C Opscan-C 0.00% 0         326 326 
Tehama 22,071 24,803 14.7% 54.8% 40.2% Punch Opscan-C -0.68% -169         219 50 
Trinity 6,806 6,482 30.6% 36.6% 6.0% Punch Opscan-P -0.85% -55             9 -47 
Tulare 91,659 106,551 13.0% 36.8% 23.8% Opscan-C Opscan-P -0.17% -181         558 377 
Tuolumne 24,526 27,499 22.6% 51.6% 29.0% Punch Opscan-P -0.85% -234         175 -59 
Ventura 276,404 343,690 19.1% 43.5% 24.4% Punch Opscan-P -0.85% -2,921      1,846 -1,075 
Yolo 63,394 80,674 15.0% 47.1% 32.1% Punch Opscan-C -0.68% -549         570 21 
Yuba 17,925 21,681 21.0% 48.0% 27.0% Punch Opscan-C -0.68% -147         129 -19 
 
Note:  Some sums do not add up due to rounding error. 
